Introduction
For more than two decades, the World Bank has been a lightning rod for transnational civil society action. Coalitions of civil society organizations--nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), churches, indigenous peoples movements and international environment and human rights networks--have repeatedly challenged the World Bank's high profile promotion of socially and environmentally costly development strategies.
Playing David to the Bank's Goliath is a particularly striking example of ambitious NorthSouth civil society campaigning. In turn, the World Bank has responded in many different, sometimes contradictory ways, ranging from short-term 'damage control,' substantive policy reforms and islands of innovation on the one hand, to persistent gaps in meeting in its own social and environmental reform commitments and "more of the same" priority for structural adjustment on the other. The diversity of Bank campaigns across countries and issues, as well as their long track records, make them especially rich sources of lessons for understanding transnational coalitions more generally.
Recently, the WTO's debacle in Seattle led the Economist to trace those civil society protests in part back to the "50 Years is Enough" Campaign against the World Bank and IMF in 1994. The Economist proceeded to congratulate the Bank for its subsequent effort, 2 supposedly successful, to demobilize and "coopt" its NGO critics. The Economist observed that "From environmental policy to debt relief, NGOs are at the center of World Bank policy. Often they determine it. The new World Bank is more transparent, but it is also more beholden to a new set of special interests." 2 Is it possible that NGOs have gained this much influence? Have they really demobilized as much as is claimed?
While it is true that, since 1994, the IMF, MAI and the WTO superceded the Bank on some protesters' lists of top targets, many other advocacy groups and social organizations -especially those closer to the ground and further from the global media spotlight --remain deeply concerned with the issue of how to get the World Bank to live up to its social and environmental reform commitments. 3 The analytical challenge implicit in the Economist's assessment is how to disentangle cooptation from substantive concessions, while recognizing that the difference is often in the eye of the beholder. There is, moreover, a basic contradiction in the Economist's assessment: if NGOs really did determine World Bank policy, that would suggest that they have much more influence than the term "co-optation" implies. For example, if
NGOs really did determine World Bank policy, then it would be difficult to explain why 3 more than half of the Bank's 1999 lending went to structural adjustment for the first time ever (a category of loan inherently far removed both from civil society levers of influence, as well as the Bank's own social and environmental reform policies). Even at the level of specific infrastructural investments --which offer critics more tangible targets --the World Bank continues to propose new projects that directly subsidize huge transnational corporations to carry out likely environmental disasters, as in the case of Exxon and the Chad-Cameroon pipeline. 4 Also in 1999, an international debate exploded over the discovery that the Bank was planning to fund a project called "China Western Poverty
Reduction," which turned out to threaten ethnic Tibetans. In spite of the Bank's wellknown, sophisticated NGO engagement, involving extensive operational collaboration, policy consultations and enlightened discourse, in the Tibet case the institution unknowingly stumbled over one of world's most influential indigenous rights campaigns.
The resulting mobilization was almost as intense as the previous "peak" of anti-Bank protest back in the early 1990s, leading to widespread press coverage, unusual "no" votes by the US and German representatives on the Bank's board, high-level international diplomatic tensions with China, imprisonment and serious injury to NGO investigators, an ongoing investigation by the Bank's official Inspection Panel and possible suspension of the project.
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At the same time as powerful elements within the World Bank continue to ignore its own environmental and social reforms, in some sectors and in some countries, civil society actors perceive the Bank's enlightened discourse as an important partial opening, 4 especially under regimes that are even less enlightened than the World Bank. Moreover, at least some controversial projects that once would have sailed through the approval process are now subjected to greater scrutiny in the design phase, both internally and externally. The Bank's involvement in post-conflict situations also creates opportunities for constructive leadership, as in the case of East Timor. The overall result is a highly uneven, patchwork quilt pattern of partial reforms combined with entrenched resistance to change. In brief, transnational campaigns continue to challenge the World Bank, they have had some degree of influence. In the process, with their long track record, they have sought to build ever more balanced partnerships between Northern and Southern civil society actors. This paper explores these patterns by drawing on a series of case of transnational coalition efforts aimed at influencing World Bank policies and projects studies, carried out over the last eight years under the auspices of the Institute for Development Research. 6 The paper seeks to extract from those cases lessons about successful influence efforts. More particularly, the paper will focus on two questions:
What is required for transnational coalitions to influence institutions like the In 1990 it helped organize an uprising against structural adjustment. In 1992 it allied with NGOs to challenge World Bank and government oil extraction initiatives which threatened indigenous groups. Negotiations with the Bank and the government altered the oil law. In 1994 CONAIE led a national "Mobilization for Life" coalition against a proposed land law which threatened access to communally-held lands and paralyzed the country. CONAIE created the Ecuador Network with INGOs to influence Bank policy-making. Eventually, negotiations with government leaders and agribusiness interests produced a more acceptable land law and a larger policy role for CONAIE in the future. . In this paper we present some important lessons suggested by those detailed analyses. The next two sections present and illustrate eight lessons, four concerning coalition impacts and four concerning coalition organization and accountability. Then we comment briefly on the implications of these lessons for future international coalitions to influence global institutions and policies.
Lessons about Coalition Impacts
It is clear that influencing an institution like the World Bank is not a short-term, lowinvestment process. Making a difference requires a sustained, cohesive coalition capable of mobilizing and analyzing information relevant to Bank activities, making that information available to key actors, and mobilizing many sources of influence. The analysis of these cases suggests the first four lessons about effective transnational coalitions.
Lesson 1: Make the campaign fit the target. Different goals require different kinds of coalitions.
We found that different patterns of coalitions emerged to deal with different issues. For some coalitions, the dominant issue was moderating or undoing harmful impacts of specific Bank projects on grassroots communities. In the Philippines, for example, the coalition challenged the building of a geothermal power plant threatened indigenous peoples' sacred ancestral lands as well negative environmental impacts . In Ecuador, an agricultural development program involved legislation, which threatened the communal lands of indigenous peoples. The new land law, passed with support from multilateral development banks as well as agribusiness interests, made it likely that communally held lands would become vulnerable to sale for commercial development. In both cases, the transnational coalition was spearheaded and sustained by grassroots movements that were directly threatened by the projects, together with national NGO allies who in turn sought international support. Because these campaigns were essentially the international wings of already-existing national movements, we, called them national problem coalitions.
In other settings, the campaign coalition was primarily concerned with Bank failures to live up to its own policies. While impacts on local constituents were evidence of Bank failures, the primary target was reform of the Bank itself. In Brazil's Planafloro case, for example, international NGOs challenged the Banks failure to ensure local participation in the natural resources management project in a setting where grassroots groups were not yet sufficiently organized to mount a credible protest on their own initiative. Similarly, the campaign to expand public access to information on Bank projects and to create an institutional channel for responding to charges of noncompliance with reform policies as initiated and pressed by coalitions led by international NGOs, in part because they had the technical policy skills, political influence with donor governments, and the organizational resources to maintain pressure across many projects, in spite of not having immediate stakes in each. Such transnational advocacy networks can articulate principles, formulate alternative policies, and press for improved implementation and systemic reform over long periods of time and across many local instances of abuse.
In still other cases, coalition leadership came from within the Bank, as internal reformers worked with external groups to review Bank experience and articulate alternative policies. In the review of the resettlement policy, for example, an internal team designed and implemented a review which resulted in massive resistance from internal constituencies committed to preserving their autonomy and freedom from criticism. The existence of strong external coalitions that supported the internal review made it possible for that team to challenge powerful entrenched interests in the review, and ultimately to publish a very searching report despite the resistance. In essence, such internal reform initiatives make use of the special knowledge and access of insiders to marshal evidence and articulate plausible reforms.
Coalition tactics need to be defined in the context of its goals and targets. When the focus is controlling project damage or shaping implementation on the ground, the local actors to whom both the World Bank and international NGO critics should be accountable are often relatively clear-cut. When the focus is on articulating the broader policies which will shape future Bank interactions with grassroots actors, international NGOs, with their policy knowledge, media savvy and lobbying skills, tend to play more prominent leadership roles. Where the target is fundamental change in Bank priorities or institutional arrangements, internal reform alliances which unite internal staff holding special knowledge with sources of external leverage may be needed to influence Bank 12 policy-makers who resist reforms.
Lesson 2: Open up the cracks in the system. Assess targets for leverage in terms of institutional politics and potential allies.
It is easy to think of the World Bank and other large actors as monolithic institutions that present united fronts to external challengers. This assumption can focus coalition attention exclusively on allies outside the Bank. But these cases suggest that failure to engage with potential allies that emerge from intra-institutional politics can be a costly mistake.
In actuality, the Bank, like many other large institutions, includes staff with a wide range of political and social perspectives. In all the cases in this study, some Bank staff strongly favored reforms advanced by external coalitions, and those coalitions often benefited from the advice, information and support given by internal actors. The most effective campaigns built coalitions among progressive groups in many different institutions. The campaign against the Philippines geothermal plant, for example, found that different Bank departments involved in the project had made conflicting recommendations for handling the indigenous peoples' lands. In that case, the struggle among different constituencies within the Bank was an important asset to the external campaign. Identifying sympathetic actors within the Bank can help coalitions understand issues as they are perceived within the Bank, recognize plausible alternatives given Bank 13 priorities, and build the internal support needed to implement reforms.
From the point of view of internal reformers, contacts with or even the existence of external coalitions concerned about an issue may strengthen their ability to deal with internal resistance to reform. When senior management threatened to suppress the resettlement review as excessively controversial, the possibility that external challengers might publish early drafts eventually compelled publication-to avoid the embarrassment public accusations of a "cover-up" of Bank failures to implement its own policies.
Institutional change in an agency like the Bank is almost inevitably partial and slow, but these cases demonstrate that internal reformers often depend significantly on the existence of external pressure and scrutiny.
It should also be recognized that in certain issue areas, both internal reformers and external pressure groups clearly lack the leverage needed to outweigh very influential interest groups and their donor government allies. For example, the contrast between NGO impact on the Bank's environmental and social policies and its sharply increased emphasis on structural adjustment and financial sector bailouts is quite notable.
Lesson 3: Impact comes in different forms. Recognize multiple forms of success and the tradeoffs among them.
It is easy for coalition members to focus on a few campaign goals--change the policy, stop the project, enhance the resettlement program--to measure success. Such criteria, 14 however, obscure important complexities and possibilities. In these campaigns, "success" definitions often shifted over time as new strategies came into play or new actors joined the fray. The more effective coalitions recognized that the campaigns could succeed or fail on several dimensions--including strengthening local organizations, building links for future campaigns, increasing awareness and skills for policy influence, evolving strategies and tactics for policy participation, shaping public awareness of critical issues, and encouraging target institution reforms--in addition to shaping specific project and policy outcomes.
Campaigns which do not succeed in direct influence may still be considered to have had Campaigns promoting pro-accountability institutional arrangements may have even bigger impacts. Information policies that make project information available early in the project cycle can enable early challenge of problematic programs. It is much easier to influence projects in the design stage than it is to revise them after a variety of national and international interests are vested in project completion. Influence at early stages is difficult if no information is available, however. Institutional arrangements for wider and earlier sharing of project information are essential to early action. Altering policies and institutional arrangements that govern information availability can enrich options for future campaigns.
Coalition Organization and Accountability
Transnational coalitions often span great differences in cultural backgrounds, economic wealth and political power. Rubber tappers in Brazil and indigenous farmers in the Philippines can be as organizationally distant from the Washington-based leaders of the Environmental Defense Fund as they are from World Bank policy-makers. For coalitions to be effective over years of under-resourced struggle, they need to build shared strategies, bonds of trust, and recognition of each others' resources which can sustain collective action in spite of the conflicts and misunderstandings inherent in the gaps that separate them. This study also asked how transnational coalitions could be organized to enable mutual influence and accountability in spite of these differences. The results of this analysis are briefly described in the next four lessons. While grassroots voices are often particularly difficult to mobilize, similar problems may affect the participation of other coalition members. The effort to shape policy on water resource management, for example, found it difficult to mobilize national NGOs, given the expense of transportation and the lack of immediate impacts of policy decisions.
Ironically, the press to keep directly affected constituencies involved in the coalition comes in part from the Bank. Bank staff have frequently challenged civil society coalitions for not representing real grassroots constituencies, and so pressed transnational coalitions to attend to their own legitimacy and accountability.. 
Transnational Coalitions and Global Influence
When we began this study more than eight years ago, very little had been published on the roles of transnational coalitions in shaping global policies. In the last five years, the research available on this topic has grown very rapidly.
the World Bank described in this paper suggest that civil society actors can have wider influence, if they can build bridges across their differences, understand their institutional targets, and learn from failures and successes.
One of the most important lessons of the World Bank campaign experience for other civil society efforts to hold powerful transnational actors accountable points to a shifting North-to-South center of gravity. In the early years of the Bank campaigns, Southern coalition partners provided the credibility while Northern NGOs had the media influence and political clout with donor governments that turned out to be critical for extracting commitments to environmental and social policy reform. These policy reforms set This quote is from "Citizen's Groups: The Non-Governmental Order," Economist, Dec. 11, 1999. 3 For example, broad-based civil society networks in Brazil, Mexico, Indonesia and India continue to focus significant attention on the World Bank. 4 In this case, embarrassing internal memos revealed that the Bank's senior environmental policymakers planned a deliberate greenwashing strategy. See Paul Brown, "World Bank Pushes Chad Pipeline," The Guardian, October 11, 1999. 5 For details, see www.econet.apc.org/ciel/ and www.bicusa.org 6 The Institute for Development Research (IDR) undertook these studies as part of a program of research on the roles of civil society organizations in shaping national and international policies. The results of these studies are available at www.jsi.com/idr.
